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ABSTRACT 
 
KAY JOWERS: Achieving Environmental Justice? The Impact of State Policy On 
Neighborhood Levels of Environmental Inequality 
(Under the direction of Neal Caren) 
 
Researchers have extensive documentation showing the presence of environmental inequality 
in the United States and have explored its causal mechanisms, which are still up for debate. 
Yet very little research exists examining the effect of the policies and legislation adopted to 
alleviate the disproportionate pollution burdens placed on disadvantaged neighborhoods. This 
study examines the moderating effect of state environmental justice policies on the 
relationship between neighborhood racial composition and neighborhood pollution levels. 
The impact of differing policy approaches is investigated by categorizing state environmental 
justice policies into unenforceable policies, procedure-based legislation, and substantively 
restrictive legislation. Data from the US Census Bureau and the US Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory is used in the analysis to determine the effects 
these different categories of policies have on environmental inequality levels. 
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Introduction 
 
 In the 1980s, advocates for minority and low-income communities and policymakers 
began to push back against the notion that environmental laws were providing equal 
protection for all. Based on the work of public health researchers (e.g., Brunekref and 
Holgate 2002; Currie et al 2007), social scientists (Ash and Fetter 2004; Downey 2005, 
2007), and legal scholars (e.g., Godsil 1991; Kaswan 1997; Bullard 2000; Roberts and 
Toffolon-Weiss 2001), policymakers now have access to ample evidence documenting the 
existence of environmental inequality. The research shows that environmental hazards are 
more likely to be located in neighborhoods with predominantly minority populations. The 
residents of these neighborhoods often lack the political power to push back against 
government institutions and industry already located or seeking to locate nearby (Marshall 
2006). As awareness of this issue increased, state governments have responded with policies 
intended to insure better protections for communities whose members are disproportionately 
exposed to pollution and health hazards. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the efficacy 
of these policies for achieving environmental justice.   
 Environmental inequality occurs when disadvantaged neighborhoods bear 
disproportionate burdens of industrial pollution (Ringquist 1997). When industrial facilities 
are located more frequently near low-income and minority neighborhoods, it leads to health 
disparities due to certain vulnerable populations being exposed more often than others to 
environmental pollution and may also have an impacts on psychological health and 
educational achievement (Sadd, Pastor, Boer, and Snyder 1999; Pastor, Sadd, and Morello-
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Frosch 2002, 2004; Downey and Van Willigen 2005). The causes of environmental 
inequality are subject to debate among academic researchers but the issue has been aptly 
described as an “ambiguous and complicated entanglement of class, race, educational 
attainment, occupational patterns, relationships between the metropolitan areas, … and 
possibly market dynamics” (Been 1995:21-22).  
Environmental justice is "the principle that all people and communities are entitled to 
equal protection of environmental and public health laws" (Bullard 2000:493). Over the last 
twenty years, a variety of public policies and statutes that purport to help achieve 
environmental justice have been adopted at both the federal and state levels. The most 
heralded of these policies was adopted in 1994 when President Clinton signed an executive 
order requiring that all federal agencies review their policies and develop strategies to 
incorporate measures to address environmental justice concerns (Rhodes 2003; Executive 
Order 12898). The 1994 Executive Order provided direction for “identifying and addressing, 
as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of 
[federal] programs, policies, and activities on minority populations, and low-income 
populations” (Executive Order 12898). It also became a model for state governments to 
follow in extending these federal-level measures to state-level activities. Since the early 
1990s, fifteen states have adopted policies similar to Clinton’s order for state activities, 
sixteen states have adopted statutes that provide greater procedural rights for citizens in 
minority and/or low-income communities to allow them more opportunities to participate in 
environmental decisions that may affect their community, and two states have adopted 
statutes that provide substantive rights to address the unequal distribution of environmental 
hazards such as through buffer zones around vulnerable communities (Public Law Research 
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Institute 2010). In the two decades that have passed since environmental justice policies 
came into existence, we might expect that levels of environmental inequality have been 
reduced. So far the few studies that have assessed the implementation of the federal order 
(Murphy-Green and Leip 2002, O’Neil 2007) and the effectiveness of four early-adopter 
states (Caren and Schoolman 2008) find little evidence that they have resulted in greater 
environmental equity.  
In this study, I build on Caren and Schoolman’s work to evaluate the moderating 
effect of state environmental justice approaches on the relationship between neighborhood 
racial composition and neighborhood pollution level across the contiguous United States. As 
of 2006, twenty-eight of the thirty-three states mentioned above had adopted some form of 
policy to address environmental inequality, yet the effect of these policies has not been 
comprehensively examined. The main questions I seek to answer in this study are 1) have 
state environmental justice policies reduced the disproportionate pollution burden on 
minority and low-income communities, and 2) do the different policy approaches adopted by 
states create different results? To answer these questions, I use multilevel longitudinal data 
on the neighborhood pollution levels, neighborhood demographics, state environmental 
movement strength, and state political and legal environments. This evaluation provides 
important information for the study of and public debate over environmental inequality and 
comprehensively assesses the efficacy of environmental justice policies. 
Background and Theoretical Approach 
Two bodies of scholarship inform my project: studies of environmental inequality and 
the causal mechanisms that lead to it and studies of environmental justice remedies and 
policy effectiveness. There is no dearth of social science research on environmental 
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inequality but much of the research is focused on the causal mechanisms that lead to it. 
Several explanations have been offered in the scientific literature for the existence of 
environmental inequality. According to the political and social capital inequality perspective, 
racial environmental inequality persists because predominantly minority neighborhoods lack 
the social capital to prevent polluting industries from locating or expanding nearby (Mohai 
and Bryant 1992; Hamilton 1995; Bullard 2000; Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss 2001). 
According to the income inequality perspective, environmental inequality exists due to 
differences in socioeconomic resources and mobility. People with fewer economic resources 
tend to live in areas where they will experience higher levels of pollution exposure because 
they lack the resources to avoid locating in these areas (Ringquist 1997, Mohai and Bryant 
1992; Downey 2005). According to the racial discrimination perspective, environmental 
inequality is the result of the intentional discrimination against minority communities by the 
business community and government officials in decisions regarding the siting of hazardous 
facilities (Szasz 1994; Mohai and Bryant 1992; Crowder and Downey 2010). Thus, the 
positive relationship between minority presence and the level of pollution in a neighborhood 
results because facilities are more often sited in minority communities (Pastor et al. 2001, 
Downey 2005). 
There is also a broad literature discussing environmental justice policy approaches 
and legal strategies. Scholars have explored various ways that public policy and the legal 
system could work to achieve environmental justice. Kaswan (2003) examined the different 
ways that governments could incorporate the affected communities into environmental 
decision-making processes and adopt substantive restrictions on facilities locating near low 
income and/or predominantly minority communities. In addition, Kaswan (1997) criticized 
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the role of traditional environmental laws in achieving distributional justice for 
disadvantaged communities and argued that environmental laws can actually increase 
environmental inequality. Environmental laws often place greater restrictions on new sources 
of pollution while allowing older facilities to continue using technologies that may generate 
more pollution. Thus, communities near older existing facilities may be exposed to more 
pollution than those near newer facilities. As a result, many legal scholars have called for 
substantive criteria, such as requiring pollution retrofits on older facilities located near 
disadvantaged communities, that have the potential to achieve distributional justice for 
minority communities (Lazarus 1993; Cole 1992; Bullard 1994, 2004). Krieg and Faber 
(2004) argue that even with substantive criteria, policies that identify communities by 
whether the predominant race or ethnic group are not ideal because the policy or legal 
protections may not apply to mixed race communities even though significant environmental 
hazards may face these communities as well. Instead, environmental impact assessments 
should be completed for all major environmental decisions. Still others have suggested using 
existing civil rights laws to advocate on behalf of affected communities and suggest that 
abandoning legislation and policy for legislation is a viable option (Godsil 1991).  
 As helpful as these analyses have been at helping us understand the predictors, causal 
mechanisms, and potential interventions, few studies have explored how well our existing 
policies are at actually redressing environmental inequality. Murphy-Green and Leip (2002) 
assessed whether the federal policy was effective as it applied to the regulation of pesticides 
in Florida and found that “the goals of the Executive Order 12898 are not being achieved by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.” O’Neil (2007) evaluated the impact of the 
Executive Order on “environmental cleanup justice” and found that contaminated sites near 
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minority and low-income areas were less likely to be designated as Superfund sites (and thus 
eligible for resources to clean up contamination) after the Executive Order was in place 
(1088). Caren and Schoolman (2008) analyzed the impact of four environmental justice 
policies adopted from 1992 to 1994. Finding little improvement in distribution of the 
pollution burden, they concluded that these policies are relatively ineffective at reducing 
environmental inequality. No studies have taken the full range of policy approaches into 
account and compared the environmental inequality levels across the United States among 
those different approaches to see how effective they are for achieving environmental justice. 
In this study, I intend to expand our current knowledge and understanding by examining the 
moderating effect of state environmental justice policies, procedure-based environmental 
justice statutes, and substantively restrictive environmental justice statutes on neighborhood 
pollution levels. 
State Approaches to Environmental Justice 
Because the particular form of policy state actors adopt may have a significant impact 
on the efficacy of their approach (French, Gumus, & Homer 2010), it is important to 
distinguish between them in this analysis. By aggregating all forms of policy into one 
overarching category, researchers may be glossing over important differences in policy 
approaches. For example, North Carolina’s Environmental Equity Initiative identifies the 
state environmental agency as more of a mediator between communities and industry and 
incorporates the following statement: “low income and minority communities often believe 
that they are burdened with a disproportionate share of [the] state’s environmental risks. This 
belief in some instances may be well founded. However, these beliefs can also create a 
hostile environment in which good faith efforts to resolve disputes address concerns, and 
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seek consensus solutions are nearly certain to fail” (NC DENR 2000). In contrast, Maryland 
regulations designate “environmentally stressed communities” as environmental benefit 
districts and owners of nearby facilities are legally required to install pollution retrofits (Md. 
Code Ann. § 13-1502(b)(2) (2005)). These approaches are significantly different and should 
be considered separately.    
Government efforts to achieve environmental justice can take the form of guidance, 
policy, or law. The primary differences between each form are who administers them and 
how enforceable the enactments are (Gupta 2001). Guidance documents contain a set of 
recommendations or suggestions about things that should be considered when making 
decisions. Policies are basic statements outlining plans and goals as well as the courses of 
action to follow in making decisions. Policies are typically internally developed often with no 
public input. As such, they are generally not enforceable in the court system. Legislation is 
the external directive from the elected body that often gives authority to agencies to create 
regulations to carry out the goals of the legislation. Each of these three types of enactments 
has been used by states to address environmental inequality. The enactments themselves can 
differ in significant ways as well.  
Environmental inequality policies can focus on creating substantive standards to 
regulate industries operating near overburdened communities or on creating procedures to 
address community political and social capital limitations (Kaswan 1997). The former are 
referred to herein as substantively restrictive and the latter as procedure-based. By far, the 
most common way states address environmental inequality is through procedure-based 
enactments. Since minority communities are often under-represented in the political process, 
the purpose of these policies is to insure that there is meaningful community involvement and 
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participation in environmental decision-making processes. For instance, the procedures 
adopted by the state of California require that developers of new facilities must solicit the 
opinions of minority community members and provide the community members with 
information about the proposed facility (Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 40912, 41701, 44004 and 
71114). Other states have created community advisory councils to make recommendations to 
legislative bodies about ways to address environmental inequality (e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 
29 § 8016A (2005)). Although such procedure-based laws are enforceable by the courts, they 
confer rights to information and participation only and do not guarantee a redistribution of 
the pollution burden. In other words, these laws may achieve political justice by facilitating 
greater access to the decision-making process but may not achieve environmental justice by 
lessening the environmental burden on a community.      
Two states have adopted statutes creating substantive standards that must be followed 
when pollution-generating activities are permitted near disadvantaged neighborhoods. The 
first to adopt substantive restrictions was Maryland, whose approach is discussed above. The 
second was Arkansas. Arkansas’ approach creates a rebuttable presumption that any new 
landfill constructed within twelve miles of a minority community should not be permitted 
(Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-1504(a)(1) (2008)). The substantive standards adopted in Arkansas 
and Maryland define the rights of these communities and the relationship between them and 
nearby pollution-generating facilities.  
In this study, I review each state’s approach to environmental justice policy and 
classify them as no policy or law, environmental justice policy, procedure-based 
environmental justice law, or substantively restrictive environmental justice law. 
Environmental laws, policies, and regulations that are not necessarily directed at 
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environmental justice have no doubt been successful at reducing the amount of pollution 
emitted overall. Therefore, I expect to find that the level of pollution in neighborhoods is 
decreasing over time. I also expect to find that environmental justice policies are reducing the 
disparities between the amount of pollution experienced in historically disadvantaged 
neighborhoods and neighborhoods with no disadvantage due to sociodemographic 
characteristics. The positive relationship between the minority racial composition of the 
neighborhood and the level of pollution in the neighborhood should be weaker in states with 
environmental justice policies and should become progressively weaker over time once the 
policies are in force. Furthermore, this relationship will be progressively weaker in states 
adopting procedure-based environmental justice laws as compared to states adopting 
unenforceable state policies. The presence of a substantively restrictive state environmental 
justice law should result in an even weaker relationship between neighborhood racial 
composition and neighborhood pollution level than state procedure-based laws do.  
Data and Methods 
This study uses longitudinal state and neighborhood level data for the contiguous 48 
states. The neighborhood level data consist of sociodemographic and regional characteristics 
and proximate industrial pollution levels in census tracts, which I use as a proxy for 
neighborhoods. To assess the impact of environmental justice policies on the relationship 
between neighborhood racial composition and neighborhood pollution levels, I use data on 
state political environments. Both sets of variables are time varying and include observations 
for each year from 1990 to 2006. The 1990-2006 timeframe is determined primarily by the 
availability of reliable proximate industrial pollution data. However, since many 
environmental justice policies were first adopted in the early 1990s through the early 2000s, 
this timeframe works well for the hypotheses tested.  
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Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable is a continuous, tract-level measure of proximate industrial 
pollution developed by Crowder and Downey (2010). It is based on tract proximity to an 
industrial facility and the total amount of air pollution released by the facility. The data is 
weighted to account for the potential effect of each facility according to its distance from the 
center of each census tract. The base data is from the US Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Toxic Release Inventory (“TRI”) Program. Pursuant to the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act (42 U.S.C. §116, et seq.), facilities meeting certain 
thresholds for the release of hazardous substances must collect and report data on their toxic 
emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency on an annual basis. The reported data 
include the quantities of chemicals that each facility disposed of, released to the environment, 
or managed (i.e., treated). This information is then compiled in a database to track each 
facility’s releases over time. The proximate industrial pollution measure was created first by 
overlaying the facilities’ latitude/longitude coordinates onto a map that divides the census 
tracts into 400 square foot grids. Each grid cell was given a score based on the distance-
weighted sum of the pounds of air pollution released that year by all TRI facilities located 
within 1.5 miles of the grid. These cell scores were then used to create an average grid cell 
score for each census tract. The resulting proximate industrial pollution estimates can only be 
interpreted relative to one another. The data were originally created based on the 2000 census 
tract boundaries but normalized to the 2010 census tract boundaries for this analysis. 
As a measure for environmental inequality, there are limitations to using proximity 
estimates. They are not pollution concentration estimates nor do they capture the health risks 
that environmental hazards may have on communities. Proximity estimates do, however, 
represent the impacts on quality of life from the visibility of facilities and odors or noise 
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associated with facilities (Chakraborty and Maantay 2011).  
Explanatory Variables 
The data for ethnic and racial composition are taken from the US Census Bureau’s 
1990, 2000, and 2010 decennial censuses. In order to account for differences in the 
geographical areas within the 1990, 2000, and 2010 census tracts, I use the Longitudinal 
Tract Data Base (LTDB) (Logan, Xu, and Stults 2010) to normalize the 1990 and 2000 
census data to 2010 tract boundaries for comparison between censuses. The race and 
ethnicity variables are the percentage of people in each tract reporting Hispanic ethnicity, 
non-Hispanic white race (hereafter “whites”), and non-Hispanic black race (hereafter 
“blacks”), and all other races. Estimates for the racial and ethnic composition for census 
tracts during intercensal years are interpolated (and for all tract-level explanatory variables).  
I include other tract-level explanatory variables to account for socioeconomic 
characteristics that may bear on the pollution burden experienced. As outlined previously, 
there is a split among researchers regarding whether environmental inequality is better 
explained by socioeconomic status or by the racial composition of the neighborhood. 
Therefore, I include a measure for income to examine the potential effect that socioeconomic 
status may have on the relationship between neighborhood racial composition and the level 
of pollution. I use household income (adjusted for inflation using 2010 as the baseline), the 
percentage of people 25 years or older with a high school degree, and the percentage of 
people 25 years or older with a college degree or higher as measures of socioeconomic status. 
These data are taken from the US Census Bureau’s 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses and 
the 2006-2010 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.  
 I also include explanatory variables to account for the type of industry in the tract. 
The nature of industrial activity located near a neighborhood has important implications for 
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environmental inequality. Manufacturing facilities are more likely to produce pollution than 
office parks that are occupied by law firms, management offices, and other professional 
services. Variables for the percentage of individuals employed in manufacturing occupations 
and for the percentage employed in professional/managerial occupations are included to 
account for variations in environmental inequality levels due to the type of industry in the 
census tract. These data are also taken from the US Census Bureau’s 1990 and 2000 
decennial censuses and the 2006-2010 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. 
Because these measures are not a direct measure of the industry present, I must make an 
assumption that people live close to their jobs and that these measures are good proxies for 
the type of industry located nearby. I also control for census region because different regions 
of the country attract different types of industries.  
  The measures for the type of environmental justice policy are based on a 
comprehensive review of environmental justice policies and laws compiled by the Public 
Law Research Institute (PLRI) at the University of Hastings College of Law (2010). 
Researchers at PLRI canvased legal and public databases for all state laws, regulations, and 
policies that relate to environmental inequality and environmental justice issues. The state 
reports were then shared with the respective state officials responsible for environmental 
justice issues for feedback and peer review (PLRI 2010). I review each state’s entry in the 
PLRI report to determine which policies and statutes address environmental justice. I then 
turn to state regulatory and legislative histories to determine the date of adoption and whether 
any other policies (possibly less or more stringent than the current one) existed previously. 
After a thorough review of each policy and its history, I categorize a state’s approach by year 
as no policy, an unenforceable state policy, a procedure-based statute, or a substantively 
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restrictive statute. In order to qualify as an environmental justice policy, the policies have to 
clearly intend to remedy environmental inequalities based on race and ethnicity and/or 
socioeconomic status. I create a series of dummy variables based on these categories.  
To better isolate the effect of environmental justice policy on environmental 
inequality, I include controls for overall political environment in the states that could affect 
permitting decisions and/or have an influence on support for environmental justice issues. 
The first variable is a measure of the partisan breakdown in the state legislature using the 
percentage of seats held by Democrats. While the orientations of Democrats will vary across 
states, it seems reasonable to assume that they will be more likely than Republicans in 
promoting policies that regulate business interests and protect public health. This variable is 
constructed based on data in the United States Statistical Abstract (US Census Bureau 2011) 
and from the National Conference of State Legislators, a bi-partisan nonprofit organization 
that provides research assistance to state legislators. Other variables capture the racial 
composition of the state legislature using the percentage of seats held by black officials and 
the percentage of seats held by Hispanic officials. Research indicates that the racial/ethnic 
identity of legislators has an impact on policy outcomes. There is a positive relationship 
between the number of minority elected officials and the number of policies adopted that 
promote minority interests (Lublin 1997; Preuhs 2006). The variable for the percentage of 
seats held by black officials is based on data collected by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures and the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. The variable for the 
percentage of seats held by Hispanic officials is based on the National Association for 
Hispanic Elected Official’s National Directories of Hispanic Elected Officials 1990 – 2007 
editions. Finally, I include a variable to capture the strength of the environmental movement 
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in each state. For this measure, I use state-level membership data for the Sierra Club as a 
proxy for the environmental movement.  
The final database is both multilevel and longitudinal in scope and includes 
observations for 71,681 census tracts over time for a total of 1,215,973 observations.  
Analytic Strategy 
 I begin by analyzing the overall characteristics of proximate industrial pollution over 
time and the relationship between neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics. I start 
with an analysis of pollution means over time and by the predominant neighborhood racial 
characteristics over time. I then use pooled cross sectional modeling to assess the level of 
pollution that can be explained by sociodemographic characteristics. Next I estimate 
difference-in-differences models within a multilevel framework to examine the effects of 
environmental justice policies.  
 Although cross-sectional models are useful for describing the overall distribution of 
pollution at the neighborhood level, difference-in-differences models are more appropriate 
for analyzing the amount of change in pollution levels that can be attributed to particular 
interventions. The strength of this approach is that it allows me to estimate the differences 
between state policy approaches in the within-census tract pollution level changes. By 
measuring the within-census tract change, this method also controls for unmeasured tract-
level effects that may also impact pollution levels. Thus, I can analyze the impact of a 
particular policy intervention even when the tract-level pollution level trajectories may be 
systematically decreasing over time due to other policy interventions. Environmental justice 
policies were not being implemented in a policy vacuum. Other pollution interventions that 
are not based on environmental inequality were also enacted. For example, significant 
amendments were made to the Clean Air Act in 1990 and were being implemented over the 
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same time period as the environmental justice policies examined herein were being adopted 
and implemented. Therefore, neighborhood pollution levels are likely to be decreasing 
overall due in part to these other policy interventions. By analyzing the change trajectories of 
census tracts in states with differing policy approaches, I can better determine what portion if 
any of the change in pollution level can be attributed to environmental justice policies versus 
the downward shift overall for neighborhood pollution levels. This difference-in-differences 
modeling strategy has many of the same benefits as fixed-effect models. The key difference 
is that in the difference-in-differences context the fixed effect is the estimate of the mean 
tract-level pollution score at the starting point (1990) whereas in the fixed-effect models the 
fixed effect would be the overall mean tract-level pollution score. Furthermore, by 
subtracting the value at the starting point from the current value for each tract for each 
variable, I am able to control for tract-specific unmeasured factors. 
 
Results 
 I first present a descriptive analysis of all census tracts and then the changes in key 
variables across time. Next, I present the models establishing the relationship between 
neighborhood pollution level and racial composition. Finally, I present the difference-in-
differences models comparing the average change in pollution level in neighborhoods with 
different environmental justice policy approaches.  
Descriptive Results 
Census tract level: Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all variables. At 
the census tract level, the mean proximate industrial pollution level is 3.844 but the standard 
deviation is 4, which illustrates the wide variation in neighborhood pollution levels across all 
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census tracts and the need to further investigate what causes the variation. The average 
census tract has a population density of .02% and its population is 11.276% Hispanic and 
12.69% black. Overall, the average tract-level household income for this period is 
approximately $42,177. The average census tract has 30.17% of its workers employed in 
managerial or professional occupations and 14.74% in manufacturing occupations. On 
average, 50.44% of persons 25 or older have high school diplomas and 22.92% have some 
college education.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 breaks down proximate industrial pollution levels by the predominant racial 
composition of the census tracts at four points in time: 1990, 1995, 2000, 2006. I classified 
tracts with greater than eighty-percent of a particular racial/ethnic group as a predominantly 
white, black, or Hispanic neighborhood. Notably, predominantly white neighborhoods have 
consistently lower pollution levels than predominantly Hispanic or black neighborhoods. The 
average pollution level is 4.539 for white neighborhoods in 1990 whereas black 
neighborhoods score 7.584 and Hispanic neighborhoods score 6.503. Overall, average 
pollution levels are decreasing during this period. Yet in 2006, white neighborhoods still 
have lower average pollution levels at 2.607 versus scores of 4.371 for black neighborhoods 
and 3.759 for Hispanic neighborhoods. Interestingly, in states with environmental justice 
policies, the overall trend for Hispanic neighborhoods is the same as that of white 
neighborhoods: lower levels than states with no policies but a slight increase in the pollution 
score for 2000 only to decrease again by 2006. The slight increase in scores as of 2000 is 
likely a result of four additional states adopting policies between 1995 and 2000.  
 [Table 2 about here] 
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State level: Table 1 also summarizes key differences in the state political 
environments. Approximately 17% of the census tracts were located in states with 
environmental justice policies in place (across all 768 state years). Another 14.5% were 
located in states with procedure-based environmental justice statutes. Only 1.6% of the tracts 
were located in states with substantively restrictive environmental justice statutes. States 
across this period had on average 30,187 Sierra Club members. State legislatures across this 
period were comprised on average of 53.9% registered Democrats, 5.24% Hispanic 
legislators, and 9.3% black legislators. Table 3 presents these same state level characteristics 
over time. Notably, most states had relatively stable levels of representation for Democrats. 
The two states with substantively restrictive laws had much higher Democrat Party and black 
representation than the other states. Table 4 lists the states by their particular policy approach 
and notes the year each policy was adopted.  
[Tables 3 & 4 about here] 
Pooled Cross Sectional Modeling Results 
Table 5 presents the results of pooled cross sectional models that I use to establish 
relationship between proximate industrial pollution and neighborhood demographics. Model 
1 analyzes the overall differences in pollution levels for black and Hispanic populations as 
compared to census tracts with no blacks or Hispanics. Consistent with the expectation that 
pollution is decreasing overall over time, the coefficients for the year dummy variables show 
a drop in the pollution level and are all statistically significant. The average pollution level in 
the reference category, census tracts with no black or Hispanic population, is 4.327. 
Controlling for the concentration of Hispanic residents in the area, the level of industrial 
pollution increases by 3.234 points for each additional percentage-point difference in the 
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tract percent Hispanic. Controlling for the concentration of black residents in the area, the 
level of pollution increases by 2.463 for each additional percentage-point difference in the 
tract percent black. The results in Model 1 highlight important differences in exposure to 
neighborhood pollution for black and Hispanic populations versus other racial and ethnic 
populations. This supports the overall hypothesis that there are positive and statistically 
significant (p < .001 for both Hispanic and black populations) associations between 
neighborhood racial composition and neighborhood pollution level. Approximately 6.3% of 
the variability in neighborhood pollution levels is explained by racial composition in Model 
1. 
Model 2 is a critical step in isolating the true relationship between racial composition 
and neighborhood pollution levels as it controls for the effects of income, population density, 
regional variation, and the percentage of persons employed in manufacturing and 
professional industries. Controlling for these other variables in the model, the neighborhood 
pollution level decreases by 0.318 points for every $10,000 increase in average household 
income in the tract. By including variables for different regions of the country, the model 
shows that as compared to the reference category (the Northeast), census tracts in the 
Midwest have pollution levels that are 0.437 lower, census tracts in the South have pollution 
levels that are 1.762 lower, and census tracts in the South have pollution levels that are 1.368 
lower. Controls for the type of industry in a census tract show that the neighborhood 
pollution level will increase by 3.237 for a one percentage point increase in persons 
employed in professional and managerial occupations and will increase by 14.035 for a one 
percentage point increase in persons employed in manufacturing occupations. The final 
control in Model 2 is for population density and shows that as population density increases 
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by one percentage point, the pollution level decreases by 0.026 but this effect is not 
significant. After isolating the impacts of these other predictors, the coefficients for the main 
focal relationship between racial composition and neighborhood pollution levels still show 
statistically significant (p < .001 for both groups) higher exposure levels for Hispanics and 
blacks versus other groups. Specifically, the model shows that the neighborhood pollution 
level increases by 3.355 for an increase of one percentage point in the Hispanic population 
and increases by 3.543 for an increase of one percentage point in the black population. These 
results are consistent with the race-based environmental inequality thesis that neighborhood 
pollution levels are causally linked to the racial composition of the neighborhood. After 
controlling for the effects of income, density, regional variation, and the percentage of 
persons employed in manufacturing and professional industries, approximately 16.2% of the 
variability in neighborhood pollution levels can be explained by racial composition. The next 
step, however, is to assess the conditioning effect of environmental justice laws and policies 
over time on the association between neighborhood racial composition and pollution levels. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Difference-in-Differences Modeling Results 
Table 6 presents difference-in-differences models showing the effects of 
neighborhood racial composition on neighborhood pollution levels across states with 
different types of environmental justice laws over time. Model 1 shows the basic difference-
in-differences model including all tract and state level controls with the exception of the 
environmental justice policies. After accounting for education, income, employment, 
regional differences, minority and Democratic Party representation in the state legislature, 
the relationship between race and neighborhood pollution level still holds true and is 
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statistically significant: in any given year, a one-percent increase in the black and Hispanic 
populations in a tract increases the pollution level by 0.934 and 0.811 respectively over the 
baseline pollution score in 1990. Professional employment, income, Sierra Club membership, 
as well as minority and Democratic Party representation all decrease the pollution levels over 
baseline and are statistically significant. Model 2 includes a control for the existence of any 
environmental justice policies and shows that such policies decrease the neighborhood 
pollution level by 0.078 and this relationship is statistically significant (p < .001). In Model 
3, the environmental justice policy variable is interacted with black and Hispanic. Overall, 
environmental justice policies reduce the neighborhood pollution level by 0.105 but for every 
one-percent increase in the black and Hispanic populations in these neighborhoods the 
pollution level will increase by 0.6 and 0.54 respectively (p < .001). In Model 4, the different 
types of environmental justice policies are considered. Of the three approaches, the only 
statistically significant relationship is for the non-binding policy or guidance approach, which 
will reduce the pollution level by 0.184. Finally, in Model 5, the different types of 
environmental justice laws are interacted with percent Hispanic and percent black. When the 
policy approaches are interacted with the percent black and Hispanic variables, we see that 
guidance approaches increase the pollution level by 0.776 for blacks and by 1.156 for 
Hispanics and this effect is significant (p < .001). For blacks, there is a significant (p < .10) 
and positive effect on neighborhood pollution levels in tracts where the state has adopted a 
procedure-based environmental justice statute. The only policy approach that is both 
significant and reduces pollution loads for a vulnerable population is the substantively 
restrictive statute which reduces the amount of pollution by 1.95 for every one percent 
increase in the Hispanic population in a census tract.  
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The results of this analysis are somewhat surprising given that I expected to find that 
environmental justice policies resulted in a weaker relationship between neighborhood 
industrial pollution levels and the percentage of the population that is black or Hispanic. 
Overall, the policies are reducing neighborhood pollution levels but are not always having 
the intended effect for the two vulnerable populations studied herein. The only policy 
approach that results in a significant decrease in the relationship between pollution and race 
is the substantively restrictive approach.  
[Table 6 about here] 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study investigates the ability of state environmental justice regulations to reduce 
environmental inequality levels for blacks and Hispanics. This study is the first full 
assessment of the conditioning effects of different state approaches to environmental justice 
policy. I expected to find that across all types of environmental justice policies, the 
relationship between racial composition and neighborhood pollution levels would be 
weakened. Furthermore, I expected to find that substantively restrictive statutes reduce this 
relationship by the largest amount. Instead I find that while the existence of environmental 
justice policies reduce pollution level in a tract overall, the effect is to actually increase the 
pollution level for blacks and Hispanics. When the policy approaches are disaggregated and 
analyzed separately, I find that guidance leads to a stronger relationship between 
neighborhood pollution and the percent of black and Hispanic persons. Procedural-based 
statutes lead to an increase in pollution for black populations as well. Substantively 
restrictive statutes work as expected and the effect is strongest for Hispanics.  
These findings are somewhat surprising but may be the result of higher than average 
existing levels of environmental inequality in the states that adopt these policies. It is 
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possible that these policies are adopted in response to a major disaster (such as the recent 
Gulf Oil spill) or adopted to appease an interest group lobbying for environmental justice. 
Decision-makers can use this analysis, however, to show that substantively restrictive 
measures to address environmental inequality are the most effective and work as intended for 
at least one vulnerable population, Hispanics.  
This project aimed to measure the overall effectiveness of environmental justice 
policies but is not without its limitations. As described above, there are many approaches to 
achieving environmental justice. Some approaches attempt to achieve justice by insuring that 
the affected community is more fully integrated into the decision-making process and is 
provided political justice. The dependent variable used in this project is an indirect measure 
of the success of these types of procedure-based policies. Presumably, if these procedures 
work, then the communities’ pollution burdens will ultimately be reduced. But a better 
measure of the procedure-based statutes would be a measure of political participation or 
protest activities that are facilitated by the environmental justice law. In addition, only two 
states have adopted substantively restrictive environmental justice statutes. As a result, the 
findings may not accurately reflect the moderating effect of substantively restrictive laws.  
Despite these limitations, this project makes significant contributions on a practical 
and theoretical level. My findings will have practical implications for policymakers and 
environmental justice advocates who wish to address environmental inequality in their 
communities and may suggest policy directions that will be most effective to achieving 
environmental justice. On a theoretical level, my findings show that there is value in 
disaggregating policy approaches by their level of enforceability and their legal mechanisms. 
The results of this study show that aggregating statutes and policy into one broader category 
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may mask the more nuanced effects of these policies and overestimate their effect.
Variables Description Mean S.D. Min. Max
Dependent Variable
Proximate Industrial Pollution Level Spatially weighted Toxic Release Inventory-based pollution 3.84419 4 0 17.7011470
level in census tract
Explanatory Variables at Census Tract Level
    Population Density Total population in a particular census tract divided by the total area of 0.02 1.9169 0 13.2705
the census tract
Percentage Hispanic The total number of Hispanic persons divided by the total number 11.2755 18.4638 0 0.9924495
of persons
     Percentage Black The total number of non-Hispanic black persons divided 12.6883 21.9569 0 100
by the total number of persons
Average Household Income The total aggregate household income divided by the total households 42177 20157.10 229.06 230001
(adjusted for inflation
Percentage Below Poverty The total number of persons living under the poverty line divided by 13.2108 11.1337 0 100
the total number of persons whose poverty status was determined
Percentage High School Educated The total number of persons with a high school education divided by 50.4401 18.6449 0 100
the total number of persons
     Percentage College Educated The total number of persons with some college education divided by 22.9247 16.2583 0 100
the total number of persons
Professional/Managerial Occupations Represents the percentage of the population in professional or managerial 30.1712 13.2613 0 100
occupations in the census tract
Manufacturing Occupations Represents the percentage of the population in manufacturing occupations14.7432 8.4994 0 100
in the census tract
Region Census region (1 - 4) … … … …
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Analysis of Industrial Pollution Levels in Census Tracts, 1990 - 2006
Table 1.  
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Explanatory Variables at State Level
State EJ Policy Dichotomous variable indicating whether the state a particular census tract 16.95383 …
is located in has adopted a policy to address environmental inequality that 
goes beyond the federal minimum requirements (1 = yes)
Procedure-based State EJ Law Dichotomous variable indicating whether the state a particular census tract14.5481 …
 is located in has adopted a procedure-based law to address environmental
inequality that goes beyond the federal minimum requirements 
(1 = yes)
Substantively-restrictive State EJ LawDichotomous variable indicating whether the state a particular census tract  1.58688 …
is located in hasadopted a substantively-restrictive law to address
 environmentalinequality that goes beyond the federal minimum requirements
(1 = yes)
Sierra Club Membership Total members of state-level Sierra Club organization 30,187 46,277 5 175026
     Percentage of Hispanic Legislators Percentage of state legislators self-identifying as hispanic 5.23739 7.33698 0 40.1
     Percentage of Black Legislators Percentage of state legislators self-identifying as black 9.30046 5.62309 0 27
     Percentage of Democrat Legislators Percentage of state legislators self-identifying as members 53.8959 11.7631 11.4 91.1
of the Democratic Party
Total Observations =  1,215,973
N = 768 (state years)
Census tracts = 71681
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6.502738
5.098396
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52.14014
11.17659
9.41866
5.399226
4.208884
6.164345
27464.69
41858.2
2000
52.71396
11.28362
9.431959
5.79487
5.742119
7.612683
30544.72
46835.58
2006
53.20317
11.43905
10.21425
6.346477
7.073648
8.883077
33549.45
46791.43
EJ Policies1995
57.00311
6.42541
7.74591
1.707229
15.41392
6.057263
16925.74
4776.593
2000
53.77486
5.338241
10.02601
2.805215
7.346985
7.972828
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7867.578
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54.67208
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0
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0
0
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4.819004
10.55573
7.885951
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53.05648
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10.77688
72184.46
69330.69
EJ Substantive Law
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0
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0
0
0
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0
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73.70154
0.2823605
17.19007
4.282468
0
0
7771.029
4275.409
2006
75.53309
0.0470657
18.59372
5.271361
1.425145
1.0025
11061.09
5993.349
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e
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b SE b SE
Race/ethnicitya
     Non-Hispanic black……………… 3.2337161*** -0.017 3.5433159*** -0.018
     Hispanic………………………….. 2.4629273*** -0.021 3.3554851*** -0.022
Household Income ($)b……………… -0.318 0
Percent Professional Employment….. 3.2373990*** -0.046
Percent Manufacturing Employment.. 14.0353731*** -0.049
Population Density…………………. -0.0259111 -0.185
Census Regionc .
    Midwest………………………….. -0.4373484*** -0.011
     South…………………………….. -1.7614958*** -0.01
     West……………………………… -1.3677157*** -0.012
y1991d………………………………. -0.2783247*** -0.022 -0.2145852*** -0.021
y1992……………………………….. -0.3972466*** -0.022 -0.2697133*** -0.021
y1993……………………………….. -0.6028183*** -0.022 -0.4114913*** -0.021
y1994……………………………….. -0.8007055*** -0.022 -0.5455847*** -0.021
y1995……………………………….. -0.9433902*** -0.022 -0.6244757*** -0.021
y1996……………………………….. -1.1302490*** -0.022 -0.7475408*** -0.021
y1997……………………………….. -1.2623792*** -0.022 -0.8158772*** -0.021
y1998……………………………….. -1.1318131*** -0.022 -0.6215174*** -0.021
y1999……………………………….. -1.2618078*** -0.022 -0.6877183*** -0.021
y2000……………………………….. -1.3407923*** -0.022 -0.7031957*** -0.021
y2001……………………………….. -1.4761774*** -0.022 -0.7738258*** -0.021
y2002……………………………….. -1.6061896*** -0.022 -0.8381524*** -0.021
y2003……………………………….. -1.7439822*** -0.022 -0.9102595*** -0.021
y2004……………………………….. -1.8777954*** -0.022 -0.9783871*** -0.021
y2005……………………………….. -1.9603641*** -0.022 -0.9952702*** -0.021
y2006……………………………….. -2.1066062*** -0.022 -1.0758267*** -0.021
Constant…………………………….. 4.3270643*** -0.016 3.0021268*** -0.022
Model R-squared……………………. 0.0632 0.1615
Observations…………………………. 1215973 1215973
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001
a Omitted category is all other races
b Reported in $10,000
c Omitted category is Northeast
d Base year is 1990
Model 1 Model 2
Pooled cross sectional models showing relationship between proximate industrial pollution (logged) and neighborhood demographics
Table 5. 
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b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE
Proximate industrial pollution (logged) 0.698*** 0.002 0.699*** 0.002 0.698*** 0.002 0.698*** 0.001 0.697*** 0.002
Race/ethnicitya
     Non-Hispanic black 0.934*** 0.113 0.944*** 0.113 0.384*** 0.041 0.949*** 0.113 0.38*** 0.041
     Hispanic 0.811 *** 0.118 0.827*** 0.118 0.262*** 0.057 0.831*** 0.118 0.266*** 0.057
Percent Professional Employment  -0.905*** 0.098 -0.907*** 0.098 -0.9*** 0.098 -0.883*** 0.098 -0.88*** 0.098
Percent Manufacturing Employment 1.992*** 0.09 1.982*** 0.091 2.012*** 0.091 2.05*** 0.091 2.073*** 0.09
Household Income ($)b -0.088*** 0.008 -0.087*** 0.008 -0.088*** 0.008 -0.09*** 0.008 -0.09*** 0.007
Population Density -299.527*** 23.543 -299.448*** 23.538 -313.798*** 23.618 -296.939*** 23.546 -313.014*** 23.665
Census Regionc
    Midwest 0.245*** 0.024 0.221*** 0.024 0.219*** 0.024 0.199*** 0.024 0.195*** 0.024
     South 0.206*** 0.027 0.207*** 0.027 0.203*** 0.027 0.164*** 0.027 0.156*** 0.027
     West 0.023 0.029 -0.014 0.03 -0.028 0.029 -0.08** 0.03 -0.093** 0.029
Sierra Club Membershipd -0.009*** 0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 -0.009*** -0.002 -0.009*** 0.002 -0.01*** 0.002
Percent Hispanic Legislators -0.014*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.008*** 0.002 -0.01*** 0.002
Percent Black Legislators -0.011*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.011*** 0.002 -0.01*** 0.002
Percent Democratic Legislators -0.003** 0.001 -0.003** 0.01 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.003** 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001
EJ Policy -0.078*** 0.016 -0.105*** 0.017
     Guidance/Policy -0.184*** 0.02 -0.233*** 0.022
     Procedural Statute 0.03 0.021 0.027 0.025
     Substantively Restrictive Statute 0.003 0.053 0.089 0.062
EJ Policy*Black 0.6*** 0.017
     Guidance/Policy*Black 0.766** 0.248
     Procedural Statute*Black 0.638+ 0.332
     Substantively Restrictive Statute *Black -0.605 0.495
EJ Policy*Hispanic 0.54** 0.178
     Guidance/Policy*Hispanic 1.156*** 0.288
     Procedural Statute*Hispanic -0.032 0.226
     Substantively Restrictive Statute *Hispanic -1.945* 0.96
y1991e -0.265*** 0.006 -0.265*** 0.006 -0.265*** 0.006 -0.265*** 0.006 -0.265*** 0.006
y1992 -0.371*** 0.007 -0.371 *** 0.007 -0.371*** 0.007  -0.37*** 0.007 -0.371*** 0.007
y1993 -0.563*** 0.008 -0.556*** 0.008 -0.554*** 0.008 -0.548*** 0.008 -0.546*** 0.008
y1994 -0.749*** 0.009 -0.741*** 0.009 -0.74*** 0.009 -0.732*** 0.009 -0.731*** 0.009
y1995 -0.879*** 0.01 -0.869*** 0.01 -0.868*** 0.01 -0.863*** 0.01 -0.863*** 0.01
y1996 -1.053*** 0.01 -1.043*** 0.01 -1.042*** 0.011 -1.037*** 0.01 -1.037*** 0.01
y1997 -1.171*** 0.011 -1.159*** 0.011 -1.159*** 0.011 -1.157*** 0.011 -1.158*** 0.011
y1998 -1.027*** 0.012 -1.008*** 0.012 -1.008*** 0.012 -1.015*** 0.012 -1.017*** 0.012
y1999 -1.143*** 0.012 -1.107 *** 0.014 -1.108*** 0.014 -1.114*** 0.014 -1.115*** 0.014
y2000 -1.208*** 0.012 -1.164*** 0.015 -1.166*** 0.015 -1.169*** 0.015 -1.172*** 0.014
y2001 -1.329*** 0.013 -1.285*** 0.015 -1.289*** 0.015 -1.288*** 0.015 -1.291*** 0.015
y2002 -1.449*** 0.013  -1.403*** 0.016 -1.408*** 0.016 -1.404*** 0.016 -1.408*** 0.016
y2003 -1.574*** 0.013 -1.526*** 0.016 -1.533*** 0.016 -1.527*** 0.016 -1.532*** 0.016
y2004 -1.696*** 0.013 -1.646*** 0.017 -1.654*** 0.017 -1.647*** 0.017 -1.653*** 0.017
Table 6. 
Growth curve models showing relationship between proximate industrial pollution, neighborhood demographics, and environmental justice policies
Model 3 Model 5Model 2Model 1 Model 4
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y2005 -1.767*** 0.014 -1.714*** 0.017 -1.724*** 0.017 -1.714*** 0.017 -1.722*** 0.017
y2006 -1.901*** 0.014 -1.844*** 0.018 -1.856*** 0.018 -1.837*** 0.018 -1.847*** 0.018
Constant 1.263*** 0.126 1.266*** 0.126 1.855*** 0.064 1.287*** 0.127 1.891*** 0.066
Model R-squared 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.0637
Observations 1206952 1206952 1206952 1206952 1206952
+p<0.10  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001
a Omitted category is all other races
b Reported in $10,000
c Omitted category is Northeast
d Reported in 10,000
e Base year is 1990
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